Broad missteps left Capitol Police unprepared on January 6

WASHINGTON (AP) – A blistering US Capitol Police internal report describes a host of missteps that left the force unprepared for the January 6 uprising – Riot shields destroyed in a collision, expired weapons that could no longer be used, inadequate training and an intelligence department with few established standards.

The watchdog report released internally last month, obtained by The Associated Press ahead of a Congressional hearing on Thursday, adds to what is already known about wider security and intelligence flaws that Congress has been investigating since hundreds of supporters of President Donald Trump besieged the Capitol.

In an expansive and detailed timeline from that day, the report details conversations between officials who disagreed as to whether National Guard forces were needed to support the understaffed Capitol Police force. It quotes an army official who told Steven Sund, the then Capitol Police Chief that “we don’t like the look of the National Guard standing in line at the Capitol” after the insurgents had already broken in.

Inspector General Michael A. Bolton found that the department’s shortcomings were and remain widespread. Equipment was old and poorly stored, leaders had not acted on previous recommendations to improve intelligence, and there was a severe lack of current policies or procedures for the Civil Disturbance Unit, a division that existed to ensure that the legislative functions of Congress were not disrupted. due to civil unrest or protest activity. That was exactly what happened on January 6 when Trump supporters tried to overturn the election in his favor while Congress counted the votes of the electoral college.

The report comes because the Capitol Police have plunged morale and are getting closer to the crisis so many officers worked extra shifts and forced overtime to protect the Capitol after the uprising. Acting Chief Yogananda Pittman received a vote of no confidence from the union in February, reflecting widespread distrust among the constituency.

The entire force is also mourning the death of two of them: Officer Brian Sicknick, who collapsed and died after meeting with protesters on January 6, and officer William “Billy” Evans, who was murdered on April 2 when he was hit by a car crashing into a barricade outside the Senate. Evans claimed Tuesday in the Capitol Rotunda.

Capitol Police have so far refused to disclose the report – marked everywhere as “sensitive to law enforcement” – despite pressure from Congress to do so. Chairwoman of the House Administration Committee Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., Made a statement in March that she had been briefed on the report, along with another internal document, and that it contained “detailed and disturbing findings and important recommendations.” testify before her panel on Thursday.

The report focuses heavily on equipment and training failures on Jan. 6, when the Capitol Police was quickly overwhelmed by about 800 Trump supporters pushing past them, beating and breaking windows and doors to enter the building. Missed information is also being looked at, as the insurgents openly planned the attack online and several agencies sent warnings that were misrepresented.

Bolton found that in many cases the department’s equipment had expired but was not replaced, and some of it was over 20 years old. Riot shields that shattered on impact while the agents repelled the violent mob were improperly stored, Bolton discovered. Some weapons that could have fired tear gas were so old that officers were uncomfortable using them. Other weapons that could have done more to disperse the crowd were never deployed prior to the meeting, and those ordered to get reserve supplies for the officers on the front lines could not stand the aggressive crowd.

In other cases, weapons were not used because of “orders from the leadership,” the report said. Those weapons – dubbed “less lethal” because they are designed to spread, not kill – could have enabled police to better push back the rioters as they walked toward the building, the report said.

In terms of the Civil Disturbance Unit, the report said there was a total lack of policies and procedures, and many officers did not want to be part of it. There were not enough guidelines for when to activate the unit, how to distribute equipment, what tactics to use, or how to set up the chain of command. Some policies had not been updated for over a decade, and there was not even a set list of who were in the division. The unit was at a “reduced level of readiness and readiness” because there were no standards for equipment, the report said.

Bolton also explained many of the missed intelligence signals – including a report prepared by the Department of Homeland Security in December that relayed messages posted on forums supporting Trump that appeared to be scheduled for Jan. 6. Part of that document contained a map. of Capitol tunnels someone put in place. “Take note,” said the message.

The report looks at a missed FBI memo in which online activists predicted a “war” on Jan. 6 – Sund told Senate detectives last month that he had never seen it. Bolton also provides details of the force’s own internal reports, which he said were inconsistent. A Capitol Police report predicted the protesters could turn violent, but Sund testified before the Senate in February that internal assessments had said violence was “unlikely.”

On intelligence, Bolton said, there was a lack of adequate training and guidance for dissemination within the department. There were no policies or procedures for collecting open source data – such as collecting information from the online Trump forums – and analysts “may not be aware of the correct methods of conducting open source intelligence work.”

A timeline attached to the report provides a more detailed account of the Capitol Police’s movements, commands and conversations as the day progressed and they rushed to move personnel and equipment to multiple fronts where people broke into.

The timeline sheds new light on conversations in which Sund pleaded for support from the National Guard. Sund and others, including the head of the DC National Guard, have stated that Pentagon officials were concerned about the optics of sending aid.

The document provides the clearest evidence of that concern yet, quoting Army Staff Secretary Walter Piatt who told Sund and others on a phone call that “we don’t like the optics” of the National Guard in the Capitol and that he would recommend not sending them. That was at 2:26 pm, as rioters had already broken through windows and Sund was desperate for help.

The Pentagon eventually approved the presence of the guard, and guards arrived after 5:00 p.m. While they were waiting, Sund also had a conference call with Vice President Mike Pence, the timeline shows. Pence was in a safe location in the Capitol for supervising vote counting, and some rioters asked for his hanging on the grounds that he would not attempt to reverse President Joe Biden’s election victory.

The AP reported Saturday that Pence also had a meeting that day with Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller directing that he would be “Clear the Capitol.”

Associated Press authors Lisa Mascaro and Colleen Long contributed to this report.

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