In particular, the summary highlights major issues with the department’s vigilance when it comes to equipment maintenance, Civil Disturbance Unit policies, and pre-attack intelligence handling.
The broader intelligence-related shortcomings described in the report are evidenced by a warning Capitol Police received from the Department of Homeland Security on December 21, 2020, but which did not appear to take full advantage of it.
On that day, “the Department of Homeland Security” notified the Department of a blog referring to tunnels in the Capitol grounds used by members of Congress, and investigation of the website revealed four threads / blog topics. with comments of concern “to the fore,” the summary said.
“The report identifies the website as https://thedonald.win and includes several pages of comments posted on the website,” it adds.
The report exposes, for the first time, a surprising degree of indifference on the part of the Capitol Police leadership when it comes to routine household items, such as failure to maintain an accurate list of officers assigned to the Civil Disturbance Unit.
The summary notes that there were 187 officers on the CDU list, two of whom were no longer working for the Capitol Police on the day of the uprising. The 187 agents listed are much lower than the 276 agents Acting Capitol Police Chief Yogananda Pittman told Congress was active on Jan. 6.
The report further points out that the Capitol Police leadership knew as early as July 2020 that the department needed to make significant changes, but inexplicably failed to do so.
The summary lists several examples, including the failure of the division to establish standard operating procedures for the civil unrest unit, demonstrating a casual attitude towards the unit ultimately tasked with stopping the uprising.
Expired ammunition and ineffective shields
Even equipment maintenance turned out to be a low priority. The summary shows that the CDU shields were not stored at the correct temperature, making them ineffective, while some ammunition in the arsenal had expired.
In another example, the inspector general wrote that a department official reported that detectives receive training every three years as required by the manufacturer of a weapon carried by officers, but the department had no formal guideline instructing them to provide the training.
On the day of the uprising, the CDU did not use all of its less lethal options, such as a 40mm grenade launcher, 37mm grenade launcher, and Sting Ball grenades because of “leadership orders.”
Ultimately, the unit was operating “at a reduced level of readiness,” as a result of the numerous failures, the report said.
The summary describes a lack of standards for Capitol Police’s all-important intelligence gathering and review department and that the department did not follow the few procedures it did have. For example, not all members of the intelligence department had top-secret security clearances in their roles, “which could have caused the department to misuse classified information,” and did not have a training program for all employees in the department.
The summary says that in the fall of 2020, Capitol Police’s intelligence department was updated after it became clear that the unit “did not meet the department’s requirements.”
As the department prepared for what it believed would be a Jan. 6 meeting, conflicting intelligence proved problematic, the report said.
“The explanation given by the OIG for this is astonishing,” said the summary. “ The ‘Bottom Line Up Front’ (BLUF) says they are following protest that may include some armed protesters and white supremacists, and the assessment 30 pages later is much more alarming, including that the conditions on the ground ‘could’ lead to a significantly dangerous situation for law enforcement and the general public. CNN has previously reported that the department’s intelligence agency concluded that threats of violence were ‘unlikely’.
The executive summary contains 27 recommendations for corrections, including changing procedures to “refine document reporting that better captures operational impact with unlikely results based on intelligence, trend data, threats to members and information analysis”.
The USCP’s inspector general is expected to testify on Capitol Hill next week about the report and its findings.
This story has been updated with additional information from the report summary.