What followed was an annus horribilis for Russia and perhaps Putin’s most challenging year to date.
As Covid-19 began to spread around the globe, Russia briefly emerged in first place. The country sealed its border with China, and Putin boasted that the virus was “under control” because of what he described as early solid measures to stop the spread of the disease.
But this approach was little more than bluster and spin. Shortly after the government announced a nationwide blockade that began on March 28, it became clear that the country was in control of a major public health crisis.
The government was forced to postpone the referendum on constitutional amendments.
Doubts have grown about how well the Kremlin is coping with pandemic management and the severity of the crisis with the Russian public.
Russia’s economic situation was also dire. The country has plunged into a coronavirus recession, exacerbated by falling global oil prices, a key export.
Such deep economic stress has threatened to derail the political program of the United Russia government, exposing deep weaknesses in the social pact that has kept Putin in power for two decades.
Putin’s political sustainability is often attributed to a simple bargain between him and his citizens: he accepts limited political competition in exchange for stability and a steady rise in living standards. But amid the pandemic, that business has begun to thrive.
Lukashenko, who has ruled since 1994, refused to leave and his security forces brutalized and detained thousands of Belarusians, leaving the Kremlin in the face of the uncomfortable scenario of citizens of a neighboring and close ally country refusing to play with a false Russian-style democracy.
The Kremlin managed to hold a nationwide referendum that ensured constitutional changes, with the help of a national voting campaign, a state holiday and the mobilization of the country’s large state sector, which accounts for much of the workforce.
Navalny had led a campaign called “smart voting” – an effort to get voters to run in local elections that had the best chance of defeating Russia’s candidates.
The Kremlin critic was eventually taken to Berlin for treatment, after Russian doctors initially insisted that the opposition leader was too seriously ill to make the trip.
The Kremlin has denied any attempt to harm Navalny, and Russian state television has developed a series of conspiracy theories to explain the apparent assassination attempt.
But the Russian government drew quick criticism from international leaders, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said: “There are very serious questions that only the Russian government can and must answer.”
Indeed, Navalny’s poisoning has shattered much of the goodwill that Russia has tried to build internationally in the midst of the pandemic.
The Russian government has thrown its weight behind efforts to develop a coronavirus vaccine, a project that has become a matter of national prestige.
The outbreak of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region has further tested the Russian government’s crisis management capabilities in 2020.
While the brief but intensely bloody fighting ended with the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, the ceasefire agreement also showed Turkey’s regional influence. Russia is no longer the only indispensable power in the post-Soviet space.
Kremlinology is an inaccurate science, but as 2020 draws to a close, we wonder if Putin is reconsidering those apparent plans to remain president until 2036.
The bill does not in any way imply the imminent departure of the Russian president – after all, Putin is a man who likes to keep his options open.
But for some observers, the bill recalled the surprise handover of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s power to then-Prime Minister Putin on New Year’s Eve, 1999. One of Putin’s first acts as president was the signing of a Yeltsin’s immunity.
So the end of this turbulent and difficult year will leave Russian observers eager to watch Putin’s fresh New Year’s surprises.